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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL McCARTHY,
Plaintiff a;nd App,ella;nt,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, "THIS IS
TIIE PLACE" MONUMENT C01f~fiSSION, JOHN D. GILES, Executive Secretary and Treasurer of the
said Commission, and .the following
members thereof:
ORVAL W.
ADAMS, MARRINER W. BROWNING, GEORGE S. ECCLES., JOHN
F. FIT'ZGERALD, J. L. FIRMAGE,
EARL J. GLADE, D·UANE G.
IIUNT, ARTHUR W. MOULTON,
GEORGE ALBERT S.MITH, and
TAYLOR WOOLL·EY,

Case No.
8037

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF' OF AP PELLANT
1

STATEME·NT OF FACTS
This matter comes before the Court on appeal, after
judgment of the Court following motions of the defendants to dismiss, without any trial of the issues and without any presentation of evidence before the Court.
The apparent basis for the judgment of the Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(R. 19'2), and as shown by the findings ( R. 188-191), is
that the defendant is an agency of the State of Utah,
the State of Utah has not given its consent to be sued,
and that the United States District Court had hereto:
fore determined that the Commission was such a state
agency, and such determination in res judicata and binding upon the District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah
The record is comprised prhnarily of the Complaint,
Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, an
Affidavit filed by the plaintiff, Daniel McCarthy (R.
113-116), and an Affidavit of Irwin Clawson (R.120-187).
The Complaint set forth two separate causes of
action for $42,145.60, the first being brought against the
defendant Commission as an Agency of the State of
Utah, based upon unpaid balance due on a written contract for the construction of a monument which is situated at the mouth of Emigration Canyon in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and which was dedicated in 1947
upon the anniversary of the arrival of the Mormon Pioneers in this Valley. The Second Cause of Action is
upon the same basis of obligation for labor and materials
but alleges that the defendant Commission is a voluntary
association, organized and associated together f~r the
purpose of providing funds for the erecting of a monument in Salt Lake City, Utah, known as "This is The
Place" Monument.
The State of Utah has never consented to be sued
in this action upon the contract, and hence, upon Motion
for Dismissal made by the State of Utah (R. 29), the
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Court ruade an order dismissing said First Cause of
Action upon the basis that no consent to the litigation
had been given by the State as required by statute .
.A. s to the Second Cause of Action, a different set
of facts n1us t be considered, and in light of the fact that
the matter was dismissed "\vithout testimony, the Court
must accept and give full credit to the facts alleged in
the plaintiff's Cornplaint, Second Cause of Action, and
the Affidavit of the plaintiff shown in the Record (113116). To summarize these matters, it appears that the
defendants voluntarily associated together to erect the
~1onument and to accomplish said purpose entered into
a written contract as "Owner" on December 27, 1945
with the plaintiff as "Contractor," wherein the plaintiff
agreed to furnish and erect all of the granite work on
the ~1onument and the surrounding area in accordance
vvith drawings and specifications which were attached
to and made a part of the contract. The voluntary association utilized at times the name "This is The Place
Monument Commission" and at other times the name
"This is The Place Monument Committee."
As shown by the Affidavit of Daniel McCarthy and
never controverted at any stage by any denials of record,
the following facts are undisputed:
That following the appropriation of $125,000.00 to
the "This is The Place Monument Committee" by the
1945 Legislature, donated funds totalling in excess of
$200,000.00 from private sources were deposited iby the
committee and comingled with the $125,000.00, and all of
said funds \vere expended by the committee without any
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supervision by the Finance Commission of the State of
Utah;
'I~hat all payments made to the plaintiff as well as
to other con tractors and suppliers of materials in conjunction with the creating and e.rection of the monu1nent
following the appropriation in 1945, were made by checks
drawn upon its private bank account as established by
the comrnittee without use of any warrants issued by
the Finance Co1nmission or by the Treasurer of the
State of Utah;
That the contract documents between Daniel McCarthy and "This Is The Place Monument Commission"
for the granite work do not bear at any place thereon
a designation that the "owner" is an agency or branch
of the State of Utah, or that the contract is in the name
of or on behalf of the State of Utah; nor do they show
that they have been submitted to or approved by the
Attorney General of Utah or any other constitutional
officer of the State;
That Daniel McCarthy as "contractor" had only a
contract for the preparation and erection of the "granite
work" on the monument and certain other items representing in total less than 40% of the gross expenditures
made by the committee, and the said Daniel McCarthy
was not a "general contractor" for the complete project;
That the committee made other separate contracts
and agreements for the bronze work, architectural and
professional services, cement work, transportation and
similar i terns in which the plain tiff did not participate,
which said other contracts totaled in excess of $200,000.00
4
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and that none of said contracts were sub1nitted to tht
Utah State Building Board or Com1nission with respect
to bids, contracts or construction of ~"This Is The Place"
monument;
That the said '"This Is The Place" monument was
erected by the comn1ittee on land not owned by the State
of Utah and that said land was a part of the Ft. Douglas
~Iilitary Reservation, and the only authorization for
use of that property is incorporated in a communication
by George H. Dern, S.ecretary of War of the United
States Government, dated February 15, 1935 to "The
Honorable George Albert Smith, President, Utah Pioneer Trials and Landmarks Association, 50 No. Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah";
That no oaths of office were executed and filed by
any member of the committee with the Secretary of State
of Utah;
That the affairs of the committee were handled from
offices situated at 50 No. Main Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, not owned or under any written lease to the State
of Utah, which offices were and are owned by the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints;
That in a general ap-propriation bill, shown on Page
166, Session Laws of Utah 1943, Item 43, the State of
Utah appropriated $15,000.00 to this committee for its
work. In 1945 the state legislature, in the general ap-propriation bill, Page 292, Session Laws of Utah 19·45, Item
135, appropriated the final sum of $125,000.00 to this
com1nittee for the construction of the monwnent, which
ite1n carried this language, "This amount to be made
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available only when an additional $125,000.00 is deposited
by the committee." That the payments under this contract were made in the following fashion: The Architect, Taylor Woolley, certified amounts due to the comInittee. The committee thereupon made vouchers to
conform to· the certificate of the architect and drew a·
check for the amount, payable to Daniel McCarthy.
~ehese checks were against its funds on deposit in a local
bank as above set forth. That the duties of the State
Building Commission are set up under Title 10, Utah
Code .Annotated, 1943. There is no record of any kind
in the office of the State Building Commission with
respect to any bids, contracts or construction of the
"This is The Place" monument;
That the committee employed various persons in
conjunction with the erection of the monument, including
inspectors for the supervision of the work thereon and
none of said persons were employed in pursuance of the
procedure established by the Finance Commission of
Utah;
That s·everal members of the committee sold materials used in conjunction with the erection of the· monument or the completion of the grounds to the said comnlittee; and Taylor·Woolley, a mem:ber of the committee,
was its architect and was paid substantial sums of money
for his professional services by the committee;
That there are no statutes or resolutions adopted
by the Legislature of the State of Utah designating a
"Commission" and that" the only reference in the Session L.aws of Utah are to a "committee" relating to the
6
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construction of the ~"l,his Is The !>lace" InOnlunent;
That the Utah State Auditor, Ferrell H. Adams, did
not audit and 'vas not perinitted, by the conunittee, to
audit the books and records of the committee during the.
tern1 of office from 1945 to 1949·;
That the allegations of the First and Second Causes
of Action in the Complaint as to work done, agreements
executed, payments made and the reasonable value o~
the "extra" services, together with the balance due and
owing, are true and correct (R. 113-116).
The defense of the nmnerous defendants, as shown
by the Motions to Dismiss, appears to be predicated
upon the basis that a prior action was filed by the plaintiff against the said defendants as "A Voluntary Association," being Civil No. 1469 in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah. This complete lawsuit is
set forth in detail at Record 121 to 187. In that matter
a stipulation of facts was filed with the Federal Court
(R. 126-127-128), and argument apparently was had on
the ~{otions to Dismiss the Complaint. An Answer and
Counter-Claim was filed in that proceeding in response
to the Second Amended Complaint and thereafter a pretrial order was entered F·ebruary 14, 1949 (R. 130) in
which no issue as to the status of the defendants being
a state agency was ever raised or mentioned. Later, on
March 25, 1949, the case was dismissed without any trial
of the issues and the following l\iinute Entry is the only
record of what transpired (R. 123) :
"On this 25th day of March, 1949, plaintiff
appearing by E. C. Jensen and A. C. Melville, his
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attorneys, and the defendants appearing by J.
Lambert Gibson, Assistant Attorney G-eneral of
the f)tate of Utah and this case coming on for
' of the defendants set forth
hearing on the plea
in the answer that the court lacks jurisdiction to
hear and determine the controversy and lacks
jurisdiction over the defendants and the parties
hereto having filed a stipulation of facts and the
court having heard oral arguments of counsel and
being fully advised in the pre1nises, it is ordered
that the plaintiff's complaint and defendants'
counterclaim be, and the san1e are hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
Immediately following the same the Clerk entered
judgment of dismissal "for lack of jurisdiction" (R. 12.2').
No appeal has been taken from the action of the
Federal District Judge, Tillman D. Johnson, in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, but instead the parties then moved to the District Court of the State of
Utah where the present case was filed.
The following additional facts are pertinent which
are found in the Session Laws of the State of Utah:
The 1937 Session of the Legislature (p. 286) adopted
March 11, 1937 House Joint Resolution No. 14 relating
to the erection of a memorial on the F·ort Douglas Military Reservation commemorating the entrance of the
Mormon Pioneers of 1847 into the Salt Lake Valley. The
Legislature recommended to the Governor the appointment of a committee of citizens of this State to procure
a suitable design and make tentative plans for a monument to be so erected. $2500.00 was approp-riated for the
purposes of the committee. The committee was to report
8
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back to the Governor ru1d Legislature after coJ.npleting
their investigations.
The next Statutory appearance of the committee is
in the Laws of Utah, 1939 (p. 184), wherein Senate Joint
Resolution No. 12 passed on March 9, 19'39, accepts and
approves the report of the committee which had been
appointed by the Governor, and then recommended that
the Governor appoint a committee to raise the additional
funds necessary for the erection of the monument, other
than funds appropriated by the State of Utah. In said
Resolution, the estimated cost of $250,000.00 was set, and
it was proposed that the Legislature appropTiate onehalf, but the Resolution decided that it was impossible
th&t year to make the appropTiation. $5·,000.00 was directed to be appropriated for use by the committee in
carrying forward the p·reliminary plans for the erection
of the monument.
In 1945 Session Laws on page 29·2, we find as part
of the appropriations bill, I tern No. 135 which reads :
''To This is the Place Monument Committee from the
General Fund $125,000.00. This amount to be made available only when an additional $125,000.00 is deposited by
the committee.' "
S.TATEMEN·T O!F POINTS
POINT ONE
THE ACTION OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE IN
CIVIL NO. 1469 DISMISSING THAT PROCEEDING FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION, WAS NOT RES JUDICATA SQ
AS TO PREVENT TI-IE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT

9
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LAKE COUNTY FROM HEARING AND DETERMINING
TI-lE ISSUES IN THIS CASE.

POINT TWO
THE "THIS IS THE PLACE MONUMENT COMMITTEE " ALSO KNOWN AS "THIS IS THE PLACE MONU' COMMISSION," WAS NOT AN AGENCY OF THE
MENT
STATE OF UTAH BUT A VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION.

POINT THREE
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
1\iOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY TI-IE
DEFENDANTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE ACTION OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE IN
CIVIL NO. 1469 DISMISSING THAT. PROCEEDING FOR
LACK OF_ JURISDICTION, WAS NOT RES JUDICATA SO
AS TO PREVENT THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY FROM HEARING AND DETERMINING
THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the interpretations thereof, the matter of summary judgment is
considered in Rule No. 56. The Trial Court is required
to make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy (Rule 56 (d)), which said
facts shall be determined from examining the pleadings
and the affidavits that are permitted under Rule 56.
The Court has apparently ignored completely the affidavit of the plaint!ff, Daniel Mcc·arthy, as to the status
of the affairs and the validity of the claim against the
named defendants as a voluntary association. However,
the Court has accepted and relied· upon only one phase

10
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of the proceeding and that is the issue of res judicata
and detennined such exclusively froin the affidavit of
Irwin Cla \\~son, to 'vhich "~as attached the copy of the
file in the United States District Court case.
In order for a n1atter to be res judicata under the
general rules of law, there must be a final determination
of the issues rendered upon the merits of the case,. This
rule is outlined in 30 Am. J ur. 908 :
"Briefly stated, the doctrine of res judicata
is that an existing final judgment rendered upon
the 1nerits, without fraud or collusion, by a court
of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights,
questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties
and their privies, in all other actions in the same
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
"The doctrine of res judicata is a principle
of universal jurisprudence, forming a part of the
legal systems of all civilized nations. It is not,
however, to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the
ends of justice; there are exceptions to it based
upon important reasons of policy. There is also
support for the rule that judgments relied upon
as creating an estoppel are to be construed with
strictness."
As this n1atter arose prior to the adoption of the 1953
statutes, we would like to cite to the Court Section 10430-7, 1Jtah Code Annotated, 1943, which reads as follows:
··-"-~ final judgment dismissing the complaint,
either before or after a trial, does not prevent a
new action for the same cause of action, unless it
expressly declares, or unless it appears by the
judg1nent roll, that the judgment is rendered upon
the merit~."
11
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Your Court has on a number of occasions affirmed
the spirit and intent of that statute through judicial
determination. In the case of Wilcox v. Wwn.de:rlic:h, et
al, 272 Pac. 207; ______ Utah ______ (p. 212), it was held that
a judgment of non-suit is not a bar to further proceedings upon the merits. The same rule is stated in Guthiel
v. Gilmore., 76 Pac. 628; 27 Utah 496; and much more
recently in the case of Morris v. Russell, 2'36 Pac. (2d)
451, ______ Utah ______ (p. 455), wherein the Court considered the question of whether or not a dismissal after
the plaintiff's evidence was in, operated as a judgment
to bar the right of recovery itself, and therein the court
stated:
"The rules of procedure are not designed for
that purpose and should not he so interpreted or
applied as to permit any such mischief. Rule
41 (b) must be held to apply only when the grant- .
ing of the rnotion rules that there is no right to
recover at all; but it does not apply to the facts
in this case where the disn1issal was as to one
theory only and not to the right to recovery."
Another basic rule of law seems to be that where a
Court is without jurisdiction of a prior action, except
only such power as is needed to dismiss the same, such
judgment of dismissal is not res judicata in a subsequent proceeding thereon. This rule was adopted with
the emphasis that a judgment becomes res judicata ordy
when the Court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. (Hutton v. Dodge, 198 Pa.c.
165; 58 Utah 228). This rule has been reaffirmed by our
sister state of Arizona recently in the case of N ew~holl v.
12
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.JfcGill, 212 Pac. ~~d) 764, in W'hieh the rPeord shows
that the prior Blatter was presented to a Court which
'Yas 'Yi thout jurisdiction of the cause because of an
earlier decision of the Arizona Supreme Court (157 Pac.
(2d) 347), except to disn1iss the case; and, therefore,
such dismissal is not res judicata.
Another Utah case is that of 1J1athews v. Malhews,
1
13~ Pac. (:2d) 111 ~ 102 Utah 4:28. '1 herein the Court
applied the rule of res judicata to bar the action then
before the Court upon the grounds that the parties had
in a prior proceeding before the sa1ne District Court,
being one of concurrent jurisdiction, received a deternlination in the form of a judgment directly upon the
points at bar. The Court expressed the general rules
that the foundation principle upon which the doctrine of
res judicata rests is that the parties ought not to be perrnitted to litigate the same issue more than once and
that when a right or a fact has been judicially tried and
deterr.ained by a court of competent jurisdiction, public
policy requires that there should be an end to litigation
and that the same issues should not be re-tried. That, of
course, is a sound statement of the general principles
but does not appear to apply to the case now at hand, as
this plaintiff, Daniel McCarthy, has been deprived of
the opportunity to litigate the issues and there has been
no determination upon the merits of such issues. One
may search in vain the entire files of the United States
District Court in the prior case to locate any findings
of fact or determination factually of the issues between
the parties.

13
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Attention is drawn to the fact that no question was
presented or raised in the United States Court pre-trial
order as to the rna tter of dismissal of the case and that
when the argument and order of dismissal was finally_
made, such was "for hearing on the plea of the defendants set forth in the Answer that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy and lacks
jurisdiction over the defendants" (R. 123). The said
plea of "lack of jurisdiction" is set forth in the Answer
and Counterclaim of the defendants in that case before
'
the United States District Court and particularly paragraphs II and III of the "First Cause of Action," (R.
134-135), which reaJd:

"II. F'or answer to Paragraph II of Plaintiff's First Cause of Action Defendants deny that
the action is between citizens and residents of
different states; Defendants admit that the
amount involved in said action exceeds the sum
of Three Thousand ($3,000.00) D·ollars exclusive
of interest and costs; and Defendants deny each
and every allegation contained in said Paragraph
II not herein expressly admitted.
"III. For answer to Pragraph III of plain. tiff's First Cause of Action Defendants admit the
allegations contained therein except that the
defendants allege said agreement was entered
into by the Defendant ''This is the Place" Monument Co1nmission and the Plaintiff, and Defendants deny that said Defendant or any of the
Defendants are an "association," but affin11atively allege that said "This is the Place" Monument Commission is an agency of the State of
Utah."
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l\Iay one examine the file and say that Judge Johnson
determined that the defendants "vere an agency of the
State of Utah and that such was the basis of his ruling_
that his Court lacked jurisdiction, or that he determined
that this was not an action between citizens and residents
of different states as claimed by the defendants in p·aragraph II of their Answer. It is a matter of pure speculation to fathom the reasoning of the United States
District Court Judge and cannot be demonstrated on the
record. The State District Court should not probe into
the reasoning or the theories of the Federal District
Judge but must determine the doctrine of res judicata
upon the record before it without speculating on the
Federal Court's unexpressed thoughts.
In 1940 this Court decided Gibson v. Uta~h State
Teachers' R·etirement Board, 105 Pac. (2d) 353; 99 Utah
576, and held at page 355·:
''The record reveals that the· District Court
did not make any finding or determination, or
enter any judgment with respect to the status of
rights of Plaintiff under the Teachers' Retirement Act. The action was dismissed, presurna.bly
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since that
was the only issue raised or heard there. Such
action was, and is, not res adjudicata."

The defendants have taken refuge on the question
of res judicata in some very early decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and particularly in the following
cases:
Cromwell v. Sac. County, 94 U. S. 351 (24 :195).
Mason Lumber Co. v. Buchtel, 101 U. S. 638
(2'5 :1074).
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Stout v. Lye, 103 U.S. 66 (26 :428).
Nesbitt v. Riverside Independent Dist., 144 U. S.
610 ( 36 :5·62).

Jolvnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. s. 252 (38:429).
Last Chalnc~e Min. Co. v. TyZ.er Min. Co., 157 U.S.
683 ( 39 :859).

Fo·rsyth v. Hammond, 41 L. Ed.. 1100; 166 U. S.
506; 41 L. Ed. 109·5 at 1100.
Southern P. R. Co. v. U'YIIited States, 168 U. S. 48,
49, 42 L. Ed. 376, 377, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18.
In the Forsyth v. Hammond case we find the following set of facts which wholly differentiate it from our
present case. Proceedings were· filed in 1893 in the
Indiana District Court to prevent annexation of a large
tract of land to the City of Hammond. Trial was had and
upon verdict of the jury, the Court entered a decree in
favor of the City for annexation of the area. The·present
plaintiff was a party to such action as an owner of 725
acres within the area annexed and took an appeal to the
Indiana Supreme Court which affirmed the annexation
decree. Thereafter, the city levied taxes on her property
and by this action she seeks an injunction to restrain
collection of those taxes. Motion for injunction was
denied and the action dismissed on demurrer. She
appealed to the U. S. Circuit Court where the order was
reversed and the case remanded for trial. The City of
Hammond then applied to the United States Supren1e
Court for certiorari which was ordered.
One issue raised was that of res judicata as the same
Issues were presented as had been heard by the state
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court. lleld: the decree by the Indiana courts \vas res
judicata: ··~Chough the form and causes of action be different, a decision by a court of co1npetent jurisdiction
action is conclusive between the parties in all subsequent
in respect to any essential fact or question in the one
actions." Then the Court further considered and decided
that the ·'matter in controversy is one peculiarly within
the do1nain of state control. Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U. S.
78." For these and other reasons stated in the opinion,
the Circuit Court was reversed and the case remanded to
the lT. S. District Court for dismissal.

POINT TWO
THE "THIS IS THE PLACE MONUMENT COMMITTEE," ALSO KNO~VN AS "THIS IS THE PLACE MO·NUMENT COiviMISSION," WAS NOT AN AGENCY OF THE
STATE OF UTAH BUT A VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION.

In conformance with the permissive provisions of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff has alleged
two separate theories in two separate causes of action.
The second cause is predicated on the theory that the
defendants are in truth and fact merely a voluntary
association of individuals engaged in the erection of the
pioneer monument. This contention is not controverted
by any Answer by any defendant and finds ample support in the Affidavit of the plaintiff, Daniel McCarthy
(R. 113-116).
The defense that an organization is a state .agency
and hence immune from suit unless its consent has been
given, is to be strictly construed. There should be no
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doubt left in the Court's n1ind that it is a state agency or
it should be required to face litigation and have the
rights adjudicated.
These defendants have not pointed to any valid
statutory creation of their purported "Commission."
As shown by Mr. McCarthy's Affidavit and the session
laws of 1937, 1939 and 1945, appropriating money to a
"Committee" referred to earlier in this brief, the bulk
of the funds involved in the defendant's activities came
from private sources and the erection of the monument
in question was not handled as required by the statutes
of a state agency (Title 10, l~. C. 1~. 1943). 1\fonies were
spent as, when and in such amounts as pleased the members; the funds were in a private bank account, the monument was not erected on state lands and apparently does
not belong to the State of Utah, no oaths of office were
filed by any member of the committee, and there is no
statute creating the "Commission."
We do not question the civic intentions of the membership of this committee. But plaintiff has contracted
in good faith, has erected the granite for this imposing
monument and performed valuable services at their
behest and now should be permitted to present evidence_
in support of his claim for $42,145.60 plus interest. Only
if this defendant committee is a valid state agency can
they evade their responsibility to their contractor.
It would seem rather axiomatic that a public office
or state agency does not merely exist, it must be created
by law. The only statutory mention of this committee
1s found in the Joint Resolution in 1937 appropriating
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$2500.00 to the •'Cominittee" for tentative monun1ent
plans, a Joint Resolution in 1939 when $5000.00 was
appropriated for use by the "Committee," in 1943 when
$15,000.00 was appropriated and in 1945 when there was
appropriated ••To This is the Place Monument Committee from the General Fund $125,000.00. This amount to
be made available only when an additional $125,000.00
is deposited by the Committee."

A general statement of the rules relating to the
creation and existence of public offices is found at 42
An1. J ur. 902-903:
"An office is generally created by some constitutional or statutory provision, or by some
tribunal or body to which the power to create the·
office has been delegated, although it is not necessary that the legislature or other creating body
declare in express words that the office is created;
the use of any language which shows the legislative intent is sufficient. The mere appropriation by the legislature or general assembly of
money for the payment of compensation to the
incumbent of a specified position does not have
the effect of creating an office. In deterrnining
whether or not a public office is created, it is
important to keep in n1ind that such an office
i1nplies duties and the discharge of such duties,
that is, an agency from the sovereign power to
perform them, so that the duties of the office are
of the first consequence, and the agency from the
state to perform them the next step in the creation
of an office. Where offices are created, the
appointing body cannot by mere appointment of
incumbents expand or reduce the number of" such
offices at its discretion. It may here he noted
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that an 'office' is a legal entity, and rnay exist
in fact, although it is without any incurnbent."
rr,he issues here raised were apparently taken for
granted by the Court and all partie·s in the T'ho11WtS v.
Da.ughters of Utah Pioneers, 197 Pac. (2d) 477, 114 Utah
108. The legislature started its appropriations in 1925
to the Daughters and later authorized a 99 year lease of
the "triangle" to thern. In 19·43 the Legislature appropriated to "'the Utah State Building Board" $225,000.00
to be used towards construction of a mernorial building
to be used only when the Daughters had deposited $75,000.00 with the State Treasurer. No one contended that'
the Daughters were or are an agency of the State of
Utah. The ''public purpose" of the memorial building,
even as this monument, will be conceded. In the
Daughters case the land belonged to the state and the
co1npleted building and land were leased to the Daughters
for a fixed term.
Our monument \vas erected on federal land - a part
of Ft. D·ouglas, largely by private subscription, through
a group of individuals appointed by the Governor and
organized as a "committee." Their adoption of a trade
name of "·This Is The Place Monument Commission" did
not constitute them an arm or agency of the State of
Utah. There is no statute creating this "Commission";
no enacting clause as required by our p-rocedure; no
supervision over construction by the Building Board; no
supervision over the expenditure of funds; no auditing
by the Auditor; and many other negative signs. verify
the complete absence of any state agency.
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A 1natter soine,vhat akin "ras considered in Sta,te v.
Bonnett, :201 Pac. (2d) 939, 11-l: Utah 5±6, wherein an
option to purchase land signed by the Utah State Hospital \\Tas specifically enforced. One defense raised was
that the Hospital, through ad1nittedly an arm of the
state (85-7-1, U. C. A. 1943), was not a lega'l entity. The
suit for specific performance was brought by the state
by and through its Public Welfare Co1nmission. The
court detern1ined that the option bound only the vendors
until and when the approval of the Governor and the
Department of Finance had been obtained. It was
further found that the Hospital and its superintendent
\Vere in fact authorized to and acting for the State of
Utah and the Public Welfare Commission.
In our n1onun1ent case no such facts exist. The construction contract at no point bears the name of the
State of Utah nor of any statutory agency, officer, or
branch of the state. Is there any contention that these
defendants were employees of the Finance Comn1ission,
the Department of Engineering, the Building Commission, the Historical Society, or any other state agency~
The answer is, no!
The Legis'lature vested in our Utah state building
board the authority and sole power .to carry out the
the building and expansion program of the state as and
when funds are available-and particularly all such when
the estimated cost is in excess of $3000.00. As shown
by the stipulation on file in the F·ederal cas·e attached
to Mr. Irwin Cla-\vson's Affidavit and by the separate
Affidavit of Mr. McCarthy, the building board was not
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eonsulted nor did it in any manner handle the bids or
other steps relating to this monument. Section 10-0~7
(9) Utah Code Annotated, 1943 authorizes the building
board to be sued "only upon written contracts made by
it or under its authority and sealed with its official seal."
Had this n1onument been a state project, of necessity the sa1ne would have been under the supervision of
and contract with the· building board. Then they could
sue the contractor and the contractor would have an
action against the state for monies due and owing. The
state board has not adopted or ratified the action of this
defendant committee. No indicia of state agency is
shown of record beyond the appropriation of money to
be used along with greater private funds to erect the
pioneer 1nonument. The 1~37 Resolution and the 1939
Resolutions authorized the Governor to appoint a comnlittee of citizens to make plans and to raise funds for
erection of the monument.
Vve find no statute creating the defendant "Comn1ission" and no statutory definition of the terms, powers,
duties or privileges of the members thereof. Can the
individuals, after doing as they pleased in the erection
of the monument, now hide behind the skirts of state
immunityf See 81 C.J.S. 978:
"Exercise of powers in generaL Powers
granted to state administrative agencies must be
exercised in a just and reasonable manner, and
in conformity with the statutory or constitutional
source of the power conferred. A board or commission on which the legislature confers broad
general powers is invested .with discretion in
choosing means and methods. of accompiishing the
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result expected, and, in the absence of fraud or
1nanifest abuse of that discretion, its determination is conclusive. State officers whose duties
are fixed and functions linrited by statute may
not waive the terms of a statute affecting the
substantive rights of the state.
"'In the absence of statute to the contrary, the
action of a majority of a state administrative
body is controlling. State officers lack power to
authorize a violation of the law."
We submit that there is absolutely no substantial
evidence of the creation of a state agency and in law the
defendants did not constitute an arm, agency, departnlent or branch of the State of Utah. Even if such could
be construed, yet plaintiff's second cause of action should
be permitted to stand as they have ignored and violated
the. requirements of the statutes relating to the construction 0~ public buildings, letting of contracts,
(10-07, and 10-0-9, lT. C. A. 1943).
Under such circumstances the individuals themselves
may be held to account and be sued under the theory of
State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac.
(2d) 502, 94 Utah 502. There the contractor and the
1nembers of the Road Commission were held to be p-roper
parties defendant where the members of the Road ComInission had taken private lands without following the
statutory condemnation procedure.

etc.

POINT ·THREE
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY THE
DEFENDANTS.

Under Rule 8 (e) (2) plaintiff was entitled to state
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two or more clailns regardless of consistency and whether
based upon legal or on equitable grounds or both. Rule
8 (f) reads, "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice."
We seek now the right to have the court hear and
determine the balance due and owing to this plaintiff for
materials and labor perforrned in the erection of the
pioneer monument. To conform with the spirit of the
Rules of Civil Procedure that those rules will be liberally
construed to secure just, speedy and inexpensive deterInination of this action, we urge that the matter be
allowed to go to trial on the facts.
The defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment should be strictly construed as an
atte1npt to revert back to the old pleadings practices of
technicalities. Rule 56 contains the provisions as to Summary Judgment which, like the motions to dismiss or for
judgn1ent on the pleadings, limits the Court to the pleadings and affidavits before him. The Court must give
full effect to the affidavits of both parties.
The most recent declaration of this matter that we
have found is -in Young v. Felorrvia, 244 Pac. ('2d) 862,
______ Utah ______ , wherein the court cited Rule 56 (c) (U. R.
C. P.), and stated, "Under this rule, it is clear that if
there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, the
motion should be denied." We are in agreement with
this rule and assert that a review of the affidavits and
pleadings shows that there are a number of substantial,
genuine issues as to material facts.
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C.ONC·LUSION

''T e respectfully subn1it that the District Court erred
in granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to plaintiff's second cause of action, and this
case should be sent back to the District Court for trial
of the issues.
Respectfully submitted,

PUIGSLEY, HAYES· & RAMPT·ON,
By HARRY D. PUGSLEY,
Atto~neys for DOJWiel McCart:hy,
A p·p~ellam.t.
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